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THE HYBRID SYSTEM OF EGYPT AND «CULTURAL CHAOS»
I n the last few years the media landscape in the Arab world has undergone profound changes. The revolts of 2011 accelerated some transformations, and on other occasions changed their course.
Some of the processes are of global importance, such as the spread 
of digital technologies and of social networks, the growing integration 
between old and new media, the emergence of a social and political 
sphere based on greater connectivity, and the synergy between street 
movements and the internet. Other times the phenomena are more 
confined to the Arab world: the decline, at least in terms of audience, 
of transnational television channels, the trend toward communication 
more focused on internal politics than on international issues, and the 
return of repressive measures and of censorship of information.
Several more years will probably be needed before we can assess 
with greater accuracy the nature of these changes, as well as their scope 
and their impact on the future of the region. The processes in question 
are particularly complex, and their development is taking place very 
rapidly, both at a political and at a media level. In this regard, it is 
sufficient to consider the enthusiasm towards the presumed role of new 
technologies in the 2011 revolts, which was just as quickly replaced by 
excessive indifference or diffidence with respect to them.
The difficulty in understanding the transformations in the media 
field, on the other hand, is not limited only to the Arab world. The 
advent of the Internet, the globalization of information, and media 
convergence are global phenomena, which today are a challenge 
everywhere that forces us to rethink theoretical and methodological 
approaches to media studies.
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The advent of Web 2.0, preceded a few years earlier by that of satellite 
television, has led to the birth of a more and more interconnected system 
of global communication, characterized by an overabundance of 
content and a greater plurality of sources of information. Digitalization 
has generated new forms of intersection among different media and 
has blurred the distinction between those who produce information 
and those who consume it. The Internet has increasingly confused 
the boundary between public and private spheres, transforming the 
relationship between politics and representation, and rendering the 
concept of the media as the “fourth estate” almost obsolete.
Tracing the trends of an environment that is so interconnected and 
that is in continual evolution has become more and more difficult 
for those who analyze the impact on politics and on society of these 
changes. It is no accident that the sociologist Brian McNair uses the 
concept of “cultural chaos” as the emerging interpretative framework 
for the contemporary media landscape, affirming that for the political 
authorities it is more and more difficult to impose a hegemonic control 
over agendas of information which are increasingly volatile and difficult 
to predict.1 Whereas McNair focuses particularly on the loss of control 
over information on the part of governments, recent events in the 
Arab world, however, put us on our guard with respect to considering 
these changes as a factor that always plays in favor of processes of 
democratization. Sami Ben Gharbeya, a founder of the Tunisian blog 
Nawaat, defines as “information cascade” the process by which, 
using different types of media, Tunisian activists were able to circulate 
revolutionary narratives both within the country and abroad.2 However, 
this process on other occasions has appeared much more opaque and 
less effective, as the case of Syria, but not only that situation, shows. 
Similarly, the increasing pluralization of the circulation of content in 
countries like Egypt does not seem to have favored a political transition. 
Governments, democratic or not, seem to be more and more adapted 
to the logic of “cultural chaos”, at least up to the present time.
On the other hand, it is impossible to deny that the changes we are 
witnessing today are still very far from having revealed all of their long-
term consequences.
1. Brian McNair, 2006, Cultural Chaos, Journalism, News and Power in a 
Globalized World, Routledge, London.
2. See, in this regard, Ethan Zuckerman, «Civic Disobedience and the Arab 
Spring», My Heart is in Accra, 6 May 2011: http://www.ethanzuckerman.
com/blog/2011/05/06/civic-disobedience-and-the-arab-spring/
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In this context, Egypte/Monde Arabe intends to propose a series of 
analyses of the dynamics regarding the media in the region, focusing 
in particular, but not exclusively, on the Egyptian case. The objective 
is to try to shed light on some of the trends that have emerged in 
recent years, while recognizing that this is a field that continues to 
change rather rapidly. In this sense, these analyses attempt to avoid 
some of the simplifications that have characterized certain journalistic 
interpretations of these phenomena, as well as some academic ones. 
On the contrary, the objective is, on the one hand, to propose inter-
disciplinary theoretical and methodological approaches that allow a 
deeper understanding of the changes taking place, and, on the other 
hand, to offer contributions that are based on solid empirical research 
and on long periods of observation.
The importance of proposing these analyzes, and the choice to 
dedicate a monographic issue of Egypte / Monde Arabe to this theme, 
reside in the awareness that the media are to be considered real 
political actors, and not only an arena for debate or for production of 
information. The possibility of a transition towards more participatory, 
open and egalitarian systems depends also, and not just a little, on the 
changes regarding the world of the media in the region. Furthermore, 
the increasing mediatization of politics, and the gradual but seemingly 
unstoppable interpenetration between public and private spheres as 
well as between social and political spheres, render the analysis of 
communication processes more and more important, even for those 
involved in other disciplines. In this sense, this issue also serves to 
bring closer together academic fields, namely political science and 
media studies, which often tend to ignore each other, resulting in the 
creation of obstacles to a greater understanding of the political and 
social developments in the region.
THE EGYPTIAN CASE: TRENDS AND CONTRADICTIONS
Egypt is a particularly interesting example for the analysis of the 
transformations of the media which have taken place in recent times. 
On the one hand, the Egyptian media system is generally considered 
one of the most advanced in the region. The private sector has many 
newspapers and television stations of a certain significance both in 
financial terms and in terms of audience. The Egyptian blogosphere 
was the first one that called attention to the importance of the Internet 
as a tool of dissent, and the practices that characterize it have served as 
an example for other countries in the region.
On the other hand, it is a media system that has also shown severe 
limitations during the last few years, revealing all the contradictions 
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within it. The media are also among the accused with regard to the 
failure of the Egyptian revolution.
The Egyptian case is thus to be considered a laboratory within which 
trends in the media field often emerge earlier and more clearly than in 
other contexts in the region.
Whereas more time will be needed to analyze some of these trends, 
others can already be identified with some clarity and can be used to 
delineate the general context, certain aspects of which will be examined 
more thoroughly by the articles presented in this issue.
Towards a more local political communication 
and the decentralization of information
During the period immediately following the revolts of 2011, it 
seemed that a new transnational public sphere would be able to emerge 
in the Arab world. Thanks to the social networks, young revolutionaries 
from various countries became able to get in touch with each other 
directly, exchanging news, supporting campaigns, and comparing their 
respective experiences. This is a public space that no longer relies solely 
on the pan-Arab media funded by capital from the Gulf region, and it 
also has different characteristics from the pan-Arabism imposed from 
above in the 1960s. The “arabités numériques” as they are defined by 
Gonzalez-Quijano, are also the expression of a common feeling uniting 
above all the new generations, which crosses the borders between single 
states, and which is rarely represented in the traditional media.3
However, in subsequent years the wind has seemed to change 
direction. The public has seemed to turn its interest toward domestic 
issues, devoting less attention to questions that traditionally occupied 
the Arab media agenda, such as the Palestinian issue and other 
international events, including the “revolutions”. The trend appears to 
cross boundaries, bringing together old and new media, young and older 
people. The virtual spheres are becoming increasingly provincialized, 
as can be easily seen by browsing through the social networks. Even 
the new digital journalism projects that have emerged in recent years 
prefer to focus on the local dimension, sometimes hyper-local, rather 
than on the international dimension. For as much as there has been talk 
for some time of creating international synergies among the initiatives 
of digital journalism “from the bottom up”, there still does not exist 
anything concrete in this direction. As for the traditional national 
3. Yves Gonzalez-Quijano, 2012, Arabités numérique. Le printemps du 
Web arabe, Sindbad, Paris.
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media, private and non-private, international coverage is often reduced 
to serving a very precise domestic political agenda. Today in Egypt, 
journalistic accounts of Syria, Libya, and Iraq are above all useful for 
remembering the cost that a revolution can entail.
But perhaps the most significant phenomenon is the decline of the 
transnational TV channels of the Gulf region. Al-Jazeera, especially, 
seems to have lost significant segments of its audience and has become 
a “second choice”, at least when it comes to following local events. 
The support provided to the Muslim Brotherhood after 2011, as well 
as inaccuracies in the coverage of other contexts, starting with Syria, 
have contributed to eroding the credibility of the channel. The loss of 
prestige of al-Jazeera and of its sisters, the satellite TV channels of the 
Gulf region, together with the growing demand for local news that 
a transnational channel struggles to offer, have pushed the Egyptian 
audience in the direction of the national television channels: ONtv, 
Dream TV, al-Tahrir, al-Qahira wa al-Nas and CBC.
This de-regionalization of communication inevitably transforms the 
impact of media on the socio-political processes. In fact, channels like 
al-Jazeera in 2011 had played a fundamental role in spreading news 
about the mobilizations, particularly in those sectors of society that 
were less connected to the new technologies. At the same time, the birth 
of dozens of platforms of digital journalism that are more focused on 
domestic issues, among which there are newspapers such as MadaMasr, 
Mandara, and Wilad el-Balad, just to name a few, can contribute to 
strengthening the domestic debate on questions that previously did 
not receive proper attention. In fact, one of the fundamental problems 
of journalistic information in Egypt was the excessive centralization 
towards Cairo. New technologies, in this sense, can facilitate the 
collection of information even within areas that until now have been 
kept on the margins of media coverage.
Synchronization and media convergence 
The Egyptian media system, like others in the region, has become 
an essentially “hybrid” system, within which old and new media 
logics coexist, making the circulation of information more complex 
and varied.4 The distinction between new and old media becomes 
increasingly obsolete, and the ways in which information can be 
produced and distributed are multiplied.
4. Andrew Chadwick, 2013, The Hybrid Media System. Politics and Power, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
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In Egypt, the process of hybridization among different media is a 
phenomenon that was already visible in the middle of the 2000s. Television 
talk shows and newspapers were beginning to gather information and 
ideas from the web, developing true “hybrid newsrooms.”5 Activists 
and journalists who had gained visibility on the web were invited to TV 
broadcasts or to write directly for newspapers, which ended up creating 
a revolving door between different professions. In 2012 the newspaper 
al-Masry al-Yaum, in collaboration with the start-up Meedan, set up an 
online platform of live blogging. Hisham Kassem, one of the founders of 
al-Masry al-Yaum, had been working for years on a new newspaper, al-
Jumhuria al-Jadida, with the first “convergent newsroom” in Egypt.6 The 
case of Bassem Youssef, whose satirical program, which was circulated 
on Youtube, was later reproduced and distributed, first by ONtv, and 
then by CBC, is another important example.
The revolts of 2011 strengthened the integration among different 
platforms. The convergence was no longer just television, newspapers 
and the Internet, but extended also to other media. The Mosireen 
collective, founded in February 2011, was responsible not only for 
collecting digital videos on the revolution, but for projecting them in 
Tahrir square, inaugurating a new form of public cinema. In the wake 
of this experience, the campaign al-’Askar Kazibun (the military are 
liars) organized screenings in various districts of Cairo to counter the 
narratives of the military about the clashes in Muhammad Mahmoud 
Street in November 2011.
Even a form of street painting, graffiti, was remediated on other 
platforms. Huguet and Carle, in the article in this issue, describe the 
modalities of production and circulation of the graffiti in Mahmoud 
Muhammad Street as a “palimpsest”. Graffiti is the object of a production 
process that is always unfinished, since it is constantly cancelled, 
reproduced, and modified. This process was amplified and completed 
by the circulation of the images of the murals on social networks, 
which introduced another level of dissemination and renegotiation 
of the meaning of the graffiti images, reproposing them in different 
contexts from those of the physical place in which they were made. 
The interaction regarding the images, through comments, Facebook 
statuses, and re-tweets of the images, recalls what Lawrence Lessig 
defines as “remix culture”, a modality of approach to cultural content 
5. Naomi Sakr, «Social Media, Television Talk Shows, and Political Change 
in Egypt», Television and News Media, 14:322, 2012. 
6. AbdelRahman Mansour e Linda Herrera, “The Future of Media in Egypt: 
an Interview with Hisham Kassem”, Jadaliyya, 30 agosto 2012: http://www.
jadaliyya.com/pages/index/7125/the-future-of-media-in-egypt_an-interview-
with-hisham-kassem.
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that is introduced by new digital technologies.7 It is this integration 
between, on the one hand, one of the oldest forms of expression, 
murals, and, on the other hand, social media, which according to Carle 
and Huguet multiplies the effectiveness of the recourse to graffiti within 
a “nouvelle culture contestataire”.
This example, like others, demonstrates the profound consequences 
of media convergence on the public sphere and its relationship with 
the political field.
As Chadwick says:
Power in the hybrid media system is exercised by those who are 
successfully able to create, tap, or steer information flows in ways that 
suit their goals and in ways that modify, enable, or disable others’ 
agency, across and between a range of older and newer media settings.8
Recent events in Egypt have often shown clearly that the “hybrid” 
dynamics of the media have introduced new possibilities both for 
challenging and for exercising political power.
In some cases, new media and old media can converge in a 
“synchronization” that can impose narratives with a strong impact 
on the political field. In the mobilizations of 2011, the revolutionary 
narratives were able to effectively exploit both new and old media, 
the convergence of which was the key to the formation of a cross-
party consensus against Hosni Mubarak. However, as Alexander and 
Aouragh point out,9 synchronization among different types of media 
depends on the conditions of the political context. After the fall of 
Mubarak, the traditional media generally went back to supporting the 
authorities in power, whereas the revolutionary movements, which had 
gone back to a condition of marginality, had to resort again to web 2.0 
and tools such as graffiti and street cinema to contrast the narratives 
produced by the authorities.
June 30 and the subsequent coup witnessed the creation of another 
synchronization among various media, this time, however, in favor of 
a counter-revolutionary movement supported by the army and by other 
components of the old regime.
7. Lawrence Lessig, 2008, Remix. Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the 
Hybrid Economy, Penguin Books, New York.
8. Andrew Chadwick, The Hybrid Media System. Politics and Power. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, p. 207.
9. Anne Alexander e Miriyan Aouragh, “Egypt›s Unfinished Revolution: the 




This experience, in particular, demonstrates that the convergence 
and the synchronization among various media introduce not only new 
ways to construct anti-hegemonic narratives, but also new practices for 
the exercise of power.
The degeneration of the public sphere after the January revolution
In the period immediately following the fall of Mubarak, the Egyptian 
media system seemed to be able to experience a new phase of its 
history. There were new television channels and newspapers, the use of 
the Internet as a source of information was spreading, but above all the 
political atmosphere seemed to make the control of information more 
difficult. The public sphere had never appeared so rich and pluralistic, 
and it seemed to be able to ensure the revolutionary transition that the 
mobilizations of 2011 had begun.
Just a few years later, however, the scenario was very different. All 
the Islamist media were forced to close. Journalists from al-Jazeera were 
arrested and later condemned in the court of the first instance to 7-10 years 
in prison. The newspapers and private television stations in fact agreed 
to align with the narrative of the authorities in power, while the most 
critical voices, such as Bilal al-Fadl, Bassem Youssef and Yousri Fouda, 
were dismissed or silenced. Censorship and self-censorship returned, 
according to many journalists, stronger than before the revolution of 
January. At the end of October 2014, the chief editors of some of the 
most important media issued a statement of support for the government, 
committing themselves to not publishing news that might be harmful to 
the fight against “terrorism.” Although forms of resistance still existed on 
the internet but also in other spaces,10 the media landscape seemed more 
similar to the one that characterized the government of Nasser than the 
government of Mubarak.
How can it have happened in the course of a few months, Kai Hafez 
asks himself in the article contained in this review, that the vitality of 
the public sphere during 2011 and 2012 changed into a situation in 
which the political control over information has been re-established in 
such an effective way?
Obviously, the political events that followed June 30 and the strong 
concentration of political power in the hands of the military and of the 
regime are the most important factors. As Gadi Wolsfeld has pointed 
out, the political field in general tends to dominate the media field. 
10. For example, the appeal launched on the Internet by Khaled el-Balshi 
in which the position of the editors toward the government is criticized.
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When the authorities in power are not divided and indecisive, in Egypt 
as in Western liberal democracies, the media have little chance of 
contrasting them.11
However, Kai Hafez reminds us that the Egyptian media system 
already contained within itself some endemic limitations that 
contributed to its failure. Following the models of journalism proposed 
by Hallin and Mancini, the author analyzes these limits by taking into 
account three basic components: the relationship between State and 
Media, the degree of political parallelism, and the development of 
journalistic professionalism and of the journalistic market.12
Briefly reviewing these points can provide some basic elements of 
the general context of Egyptian media and of their relationship with the 
political field.
Egypt is still dominated by State media that have never been 
reorganized into a genuine public service, as happened, in different 
forms, in European countries. Although this element has long been 
the center of a debate among journalists,13 today there is still no clear 
idea about a possible reform of the public sector of the media. The 
Constitution of Morsi of 2012 did not concern itself with solving some of 
the structural problems of the sector, and in fact encouraged stagnation 
in the organization of the media landscape. The new Constitution of 
2014 contains more explicit references to freedom of expression,14 
and, at least on paper, is a step forward compared to the preceding 
one.15 Among the most important aspects there is even the creation of 
a National Media Council: elected by the Parliament, it should have a 
function of supervision of the media and of elaboration of an ethical 
code for journalists. These are potential improvements which, however, 
11. Gadi Wolfsfeld, 1997, Media and Political Conflict: News from the 
Middle East, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
12. Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini, 2004, Comparing Media Systems: 
Three Models of Media and Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
13. See in this regard the chapter “Stimuli for a Public Service Ethos” in 
Naomi Sakr, 2013, Transformations in Egyptian Journalism, I.B. Tauris, 
London.
14. Article 71 declares that “It is prohibited to censor, confiscate, suspend 
or shut down Egyptian newspapers and media in any way. Exception may 
be made for limited censorship in time of war or general mobilization»: 
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/final_constitution_-idea-_english-2_
dec_2013-signed.pdf





are in fact annulled by the ambiguity that characterizes the Constitution 
as a whole. The list of cases in which journalists can be tried by military 
courts, for example, seems to be made to be able to include any type 
of situation.16
The second element analyzed by Hafez is the “political parallelism” 
of the Egyptian media, namely the tendency to produce partisan 
information, which adopts specific political positions, at the expense of 
professional rituals such as objectivity. The Egyptian media, therefore, 
offer an external, but not internal, pluralism: taken as a whole, they 
reflect different opinions, but rarely are the differences expressed 
in a single television channel or newspaper. This has encouraged a 
polarization of civil society and a radicalization of positions, as the 
clash between supporters and opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood 
can demonstrate. The problem, Hafez maintains, is that in young 
democracies, characterized by greater instability, political parallelism 
can hinder the formation of the consensus that is necessary for building 
shared democratic institutions.
The third element concerns the relationship between economy and 
media. In Egypt, the concentration of capital that characterizes the 
society as a whole is also reflected in the distribution of ownership of 
the communication industry. The private media are all in the hands of 
a limited number of businessmen close to the regime, and the difficulty 
of generating profits through advertising and sale of copies renders even 
more difficult the emergence of pure publishers, that is, publishers who 
have no interest in other economic sectors. The experience of Ibrahim 
Eissa, co-founder of the television channel al-Tahrir, is exemplary from 
this point of view. This journalist, as early as October 2011, decided 
to sell his shares in the channel, founded a few months earlier, to two 
businessmen. Those same shares were sold a short time later to Suleiman 
Amer, a businessman close to Hosni Mubarak. The difficulty of setting 
up independent media is also illustrated by the case of Hisham Kassem, 
who for years has been searching in vain for private entrepreneurs for 
his al-Gumhuriya al-Jadida. One of the reasons is that Kassem sets as a 
fundamental condition that none of the owners can exceed 10% of the 
shares, to avoid interference in the editorial policy of the newspaper.
Finally, the last element concerns the professional culture of the 
journalists. The absence of independent trade unions for the press and 
the inability of the existing ones to protect journalists from political 
16. See, on this point, Basil El-Dabh, “Egypt’s Media Crackdown and the 
New Constitution”, Timep, 24 January 2014: http://timep.org/analysis/media-
crackdown
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power have impeded, even after the revolution, the development of an 
independent professionalism based on well-defined ethical rules.
In the final analysis, Hafez maintains, the Egyptian model can 
be compared to the Mediterranean journalistic models, as they are 
described by Hallin and Mancini, and it is shown to be particularly 
inappropriate in a non-democratic and unstable context like that of 
contemporary Egypt.
Whereas the article by Kai Hafez highlights the flaws endemic to 
the Egyptian media system, the contributions of Bachir Ben Aziz and 
Marianna Ghiglia concentrate on the role of the private media as sources 
of a renewal of journalistic production that expands the space of what 
can be said, and offers new perspectives for the recounting of reality.
Bachir Ben Aziz highlights the fact that the advent of the private 
media has introduced new ways of organizing journalistic work 
and the production of news. The private media occupy a space that 
is necessarily different from that of the public media: they have less 
access to political sources and official events, they must draw on a 
younger generation of journalists, and, in order to compete, they need 
to identify issues and problem areas to which the state media dedicate 
less attention.
These are also the elements, strictly bound to journalistic work, 
rather than to a choice of editorial policy, which make the private media 
the best vehicles for new reconstructions of reality, including protest 
movements. It is thus precisely the different organization of journalistic 
work that allows the tracing of the “itineraries of collective action” that 
inspired the workers’ protests in Egypt in the second half of the 2000s.
The article by Marianna Ghiglia instead examines the experience 
of the daily newspaper al-Badil. Founded in 2007, “neither partisan 
newspaper, nor private newspaper”, al-Badil is a unique case in the 
history of the Egyptian media. Differently from other private media, 
it is a newspaper conceived as a true political actor, to carry out a 
political militancy of opposition which cannot be expressed in a party 
organization.
Rethinking the role of new technologies
The role of new technologies in the context of the so-called “Arab 
Spring” has been one of the most discussed issues in recent years, 
both in the media and in university environments. As Yves Gonzalez-
Quijano explains in his article, the opposition between cyber optimists 
and pessimists, as well as an excess of enthusiasm and of criticism, 
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have often constituted the elements of a debate which, even today, 
still offers few certainties regarding the effects of new technologies on 
socio-political processes in the region.
The article by Gonzalez-Quijano traces the principal elements 
of the discussion about the so-called “Facebook Revolution”, trying 
to outline an evaluation of the role of new media in the context of 
the revolts of 2011 and during subsequent years. At the same time, it 
invites us to consider the effects of new technologies in the long term, 
instead of concentrating, as has been done so far in most cases, on the 
relationship between web 2.0 and street protests.
As Hanan Badr describes in his article, the effects of social networks 
depend on structural and cultural factors pertaining to the context 
considered. The political culture in Egypt is thus reflected in social 
networks, interfering with the possibility to use them as democratic 
tools. In the same way, structural factors are another limit, ranging from 
the virtual architectures utilized to the government institutions that use 
the Internet in a more and more effective way. In this sense, to use 
the expression of Dutton, the Internet should not be seen as another 
medium of the “fourth estate”, but can be considered more similar to a 
“fifth estate”: a space of interrelationships contested by various actors 
and powers, the effects of which are still to be determined.17
A critical new reading of the dynamics within the networks of cyber-
activism can consequently be a starting point from which to begin 
again to approach these issues in a more effective way. To this end, 
integrating the theories of new media with ethnographic, sociological 
and anthropological approaches, as some of the articles in this issue 
do, can be an antidote to be used, as Miriyam Aouragh states, “to 
push back the narrow presumptions about the universality of digital 
experiences.”18
Today we know that the networks of activism are not intrinsically 
democratic, as Enrico De Angelis explains in his article, and that forms 
of power and inequality emerge in the spaces online, just as they do 
in those offline; that the contents circulating on the web can be easily 
falsified also in the political field; and that the networks demonstrate 
a certain fragility when it comes to contrasts with other groups, as we 
17. William H. Dutton, 2009, “The Fifth Estate Emerging through the 
Network of Networks”, Prometheus: Critical Studies in Innovation, vol. 27, 
no. 1, pp. 15.
18. Miriyam Aouragh, 2012, «Social Media, Mediation and the Arab 
Revolutions», TripleC, 10 (2), 518-536.
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have seen in the elections in Egypt and Tunisia, against more structured 
organizations. Above all, it is necessary to recognize that society tends 
to transform the Internet at a faster speed than that of the transformations 
occurring in the opposite direction.
However, once the limits of activism online have been recognized, 
we cannot ignore all those cases in which it has generated innovative 
social and political experiences, the impact of which has produced 
concrete changes. An example is the Tunisian forum SfaxOnline, 
described in the article by Carboni, Crisponi, and Sistu which concludes 
this issue of Egypte/Monde Arabe.
The experience of SfaxOnline reveals practices of use of the Internet 
that are different from those based on digital social networks, on which 
most of the analysis has focused in recent years. It shows the use of the 
web as a means of aggregation and collective exchange within a local 
community. This no longer fits the description of networks of weak ties, 
those which the social networks tend to create through an interaction 
that is above all virtual. Instead, the web emerges as a technology that 
can generate new practices of coexistence and of cultural exchange 
within a community whose boundaries are well defined and limited. 
On the one hand, the activities of moderation of the site can remind us 
of those used within groups like “We are all Khaled Said”, and, as in 
that case, they result in people approaching politics who had previously 
been excluded from it. On the other hand, it is a platform that is based 
on the strong ties in a community that already exists, but which has no 
other spaces for public debate. It may seem to be a return to the past, to 
a time before social networks. However, rethinking the practices of the 
use of new media can also mean this: discarding or reinventing those 
forms of activities that have proven not to be functional in the long run.
